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The Future of China: Three
Scenarios
by Murray Weidenbaum
As we begin to think about the 21st century, we
are entering a time of fundamental global change.
The most dramatic shift will be the movement of
China to the status of great power. Yet, the only
specific forecast for the future of China that we can
make with confidence is that a straight-line extrapolation is most unlikely to occur. China will not
continue to grow at double digit rates for the coming decade. Nor is the rest of Southeast Asia going
to grow at the 8 percent that has been registered for
the past decade and more. Nor is everything going
to go smoothly.
The uncertainties facing China and Southeast
Asia generally are profound and numerous. What
follows the death of Deng Xiaoping? Will the Hong
Kong integration go well? Will Beijing and Taipei
develop a modus vivendi, rather than continue to
move from crisis to crisis? Will Indonesia experience political and economic turbulences after
Suharto passes from the scene? What about energy
shortages, environmental problems, corruption, piracy, et al.? Surely, there is no shortage of questions and policy problems to be faced.
In a sense, we all have learned humility from
the collapse of the Soviet Union. Every China expert now begins the forecast with a caveat: None of
us really knows what will happen after Deng goes
(assuming he hasn't already). The sensible approach
is to develop several scenarios and examine their
implications.
Murray Weidenbaum is chairman of the Center for the
Study of American Business and Mallinckrodt Distinguished University Professor at Washington University
in St. Louis. This article draws heavily from Murray
Weidenbaum and Samuel Hughes, The Bamboo Network
(New York: Free Press, 1996).
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Figure 1

This is the trouble-free scenario, at least compared to the others. In scenario #1, China completes the transition to a market-based, privately run
economy. Within the coming decade, it overtakes
Japan as the largest economy of Asia (see Figure
1). This assumes, of course, that, after Deng's
death, economic reformers maintain policy control.
Also, Hong Kong is successfully incorporated into
the People's Republic of China and closer economic
and cultural ties are developed with Taiwan. Quietly, Chinese and Thiwanese companies are already

joining forces to explore for oil in the South China
Sea. A Taiwan-based firm is investing in the project
through its Panamanian subsidiary to skirt the Taipei
ban on direct investment in China. In scenario #1,
Western investment replaces the overseas Chinese
family enterprises (the bamboo network) as the major source of capital for China's continued economic
expansion.
As was the case in Korea and Taiwan, greater
wealth and prosperity lead to political reform. In
essence, China will be following the Asian model
of development. In the West, priority is given to
personal freedom and political liberties. The Asian
development process works the other way. The expansion of economic freedom initially occurs at a
time of continued political repression. Yet, the rise
of a middle class and of private enterprise disperses
power in the society. As a result, pressures arise
for greater political freedom. Witness Taiwan recently held its first free presidential election.
Some serious complications are dealt with successfully by the Chinese authorities. Economic
growth continues, but at a more sustainable 8 percent. However, inflationary pressures heat up.
Nevertheless, the central bank learns to deal with
these matters and is granted the power to take decisive action.
The strong military establishment cooperates with
the civilian authorities in this scenario. The People's
Liberation Army (PLA) shares in the general prosperity through its substantial business holdings.
Inefficient state-owned firms are reorganized.
Their deficits no longer sop up domestic investment
capital. The government in its dealings with these
perennial deficit operations takes a sink or swim
attitude. As a result, some sink, but some swim
also. A modern legal system is gradually constructed, an important step in attracting large
amounts of investment capital from the West. Property rights, accounting conventions, and commercial banking are established. Some complications
are going to be very difficult to deal with, even in
the most optimistic circumstances. Energy short-

2

3

Growth Scenario Showing
China Catching Up
$14,000

i

1:

- - - - - China /Hong
Kong
-Japan

$12,000

eli $10,000
;;i

--U.S.

$6,000
$4,000
$2,000

catches up to Japan

W~+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-~

Year

Note: Because of considerable difficulty in estimating
China's GDP, the World Bank's purchasing power
parity (PPP) is averaged with conventional GDP
based upon international exchange rates to forecast
China's growth scenario.

Source:

Murray Weidenbaum and Samuel Hughes, The
Bamboo Network (New York: The Free Press,
1996), p. 226.

Scenario #1: Successful Transition to
a Market Economy

ages will grow with economic expansion.
All of the responses involve serious side effects.
One solution is to exploit potentials of the South
China Sea. However, such action would stir up
problems with Malaysia, Philippines, Vietnam, and
Taiwan because China claims areas now held by or
also claimed by one or more of those smaller Southeast Asian nations. The possibility of military confrontation with the United States would arise. Alternatively, the Tarim Basin reserves in the far westem part of China could be developed more intensively. This approach would require building all
sorts of expensive supporting infrastructure. Quickly
developing the Tarim petroleum reserves also requires giving western oil companies a much larger
role, especially in awarding them more attractive
sites now reserved for future exploration supposedly by domestic firms which somehow will acquire the requisite technology.

coal usage will be a dangerous response to the lack
of an adequate petroleum supply.
In the long run, China's continued rapid economic expansion may be limited by envirorunental
and resource constraints. China is already the
world's third largest emitter of greenhouse gases.
Generating an adequate energy supply will require
tradeoffs with economic, social, and political objectives. Dealing with all these issues will be a
very tall order. If China can succeed, it will give
the United States a run for its money for being the
largest economy in the middle of the 21st century
(see Figure 1). However, other scenarios need to
be considered.
Scenario #2: Reversion to Communism

The Chinese show a marked reluctance to share
wealth, unlike the Arab goverrunents which welcome British and American exploration companies.
China's lingering fears of imperialism are very
strong, which is understandable given the country's
history of foreign exploitation and occupation, especially by Great Britain and Japan.
Infrastructure shortcomings will worsen as the
economy expands rapidly. There is limited incentive for large-scale public investment. Meanwhile,
the growth of air travel and widespread use of cellular phones partially fill the gap. Simultaneously,
envirorunental pollution will accelerate with the rising output of a growing economy. The "cleaner"
coal reserves soon will be used up, and thus more

If Scenario #1 requires everything to go right,
Scenario #2 means everything goes wrong. In essence, China remains a communist nation and the
hard liners take control after Deng. They quickly
limit or reverse economic reforms. Mang lui (the
dispossessed peasants) support reversion to communism which represents an abrupt shift from the
initial strong support of farmers for Deng's economic liberalization. The existing special economic
zones would remain, but their rights and privileges
would be restricted. No new zones would be created. The special privileges now accorded to foreign investment (which have been cut back in the
past year) would be ended.
The rich and vibrant economy of Hong Kong
would be squeezed for two reasons. First, Shanghai - whose goverrunent is dominated by national
goverrunent loyalists - would seize the opportunity
to regain its supremacy among the cities of China.
Second, the power structure in Beijing would try to
take over at least a portion of Hong Kong's great
wealth. Greed surely is still a motivating factor.
Under the second scenario, the power of the
military increases, especially given the almost universal desire to maintain order (to avoid luan, chaos).
A stronger military is likely to result in more saberrattling in the South China Sea as well as serious
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If China can succeed, it will give the
United States a run for its money for
being the largest economy in the
middle of the 2 P1 century.

threats to Taiwan. Surely, the American desire for a
peaceful settlement of the relationship between the
mainland and Thiwan is a highly desirable objective.
However, the touchiness of the People's Republic of
China on this issue is understandable when viewed
in a historical context. When I expressed this view
at a meeting with Chinese government officials, they
responded with a pointed question; did not the United
States use military force when the South attempted
to secede in the 1860s?
If the second scenario becomes a reality, China's
economy likely will nose-dive. Much of the bamboo network investment would move to Southeast
Asia, Australia, and the West. New Western investment would virtually cease except for the funds
that would be necessary to protect existing investments.
In this eventuality, India pushes to replace China
as Asia's leading growth area. That huge nation
would bring special assets to the competition: widespread use of the English language and establishment of a modem legal system (patterned after the
British). However, India is also hobbled by a cumbersome bureaucracy which is a major inhibitor to
investment, entrepreneurship, and innovation.
At the same time, Singapore, Malaysia, and
Indonesia would try to develop a new "growth triangle" modeled after the successful "growth triangle" of Taiwan, Hong Kong, and coastal China.
Despite the political differences, the economic unification of that area has been very successful. A
substantial amount of cross trade and cross investment occurs. All in all, the second scenario describes a very unstable situation. Likely, it would
lead to a very different scenario.

sible candidates for splitting up include the Moslem areas of Mongolia and Xinjiang (the latter containing the vital oil reserves in the Tarim Basin),
the Buddhist area of Tibet, and the Japanese-oriented area of Manchuria. If such an extreme eventuality would occur, it would leave the Han Chinese
in control of industrialized Southern and Eastern
regions - notably Beijing, Shanghai, and
Guangdong - as well as much of agricultural central China. China would become a major source of
political and military instability in Asia, but no
longer a major economic competitor. One scary
prospect is the possibility of refugees by the millions fleeing to adjacent countries.
What Is Likely to Occur?

China's situation could go from bad to worse.
In the broad sweep of that nation's history, China
has not always been united. What we would call
the "outer empire" (which excludes the Han or ethnic Chinese) could separate and fragment. Pos-

It is not likely that any of the three scenarios
will occur as spelled out here. A "Chinese menu"
could occur (some from column A and some from
column B), avoiding an extreme outcome. Theresult could be a shifting combination of economic
openness, socialist ideology, and local independence.
As described by one analyst, the following relationship would develop: "Beijing will pretend to
rule the provinces, and the provinces will pretend
to be ruled by Beijing." In any event, neither policy
nor practice will move in a straight line - nor to a
polar alternative.
A parallel to the United States comes to mind.
The competition between Jefferson and Hamilton
- especially between centralized control and decentralized operations - endures to this day. From
time to time, we go to bigger government, then to
smaller government, and then reverse field again.
Similarly, shifts occur in federalism, with states
gaining ascendancy at times, later local governments
assuming more responsibility, and often followed
by the role of the federal government rising rapidly.
The United States is a mixed economy, with
substantial government intervention in the economy,
but in a very uneven manner. Consider the different positions of the defense industry, the automotive industry, and the chemical industry. In the de-
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Scenario #3:
Instability and Fragmentation

fense industry, the government carefully determines
the product to be sold and the way it is manufactured. In the auto industry, the government strongly
influences the nature of the final product, but not
the production or marketing process. In the chemical industry, government strongly influences manufacturing and distribution, and only occasionally the
specific nature of the product. Why would we expect China to be very different?
The Outlook

fundamentally, there is little negative history between the two nations. This is quite unlike the Japanese (the memories of the World War II occupation
are still vivid among the older generation) and the
British. In the latter case, the two opium wars a
century ago may be dim in the memories of Westerners. But the Chinese clearly recall that period
of blatant imperialism where the English used their
military might to force the Chinese to buy opium
from British India.

In any eventuality, China is becoming a great
power with all sorts of foibles and shortcomings.
We have to learn to accept that, as we do in the case
of other superpowers. It is dangerous for our foreign policy to be driven by narrow domestic forces .
Some of the issues they raise are quite self-serving,
when carefully examined. Yes, the Chinese use
prison labor. But so do we. In our case, it is called
the Federal Prisons Industry, a bureau in the U.S.
Department of Justice.
Yes, Asian companies pay much lower wages
than American workers receive. But like us, they
pay the wage prevailing in the region where the
workers perform. Those that advocate U.S. firms
paying U.S. wage rates in Asia are economically
illiterate or playing games - the old protectionist
game. On reflection, there is nothing sinful or even
surprising when employers pay market wages, rather
than viewing their role as an eleemosynary institution.
The use of child labor is a more difficult issue.
It helps to remember that, at the comparable stage
of development, we used child labor. In the case of
poor Asian countries today, sadly, brothels (not idyllic homes) are often the alternative to low wage factories. But as our economy developed, we shifted
away from the widespread use of child labor. It is
useful to recall that we did not change because of
foreign pressure.
On the positive side, the United States has no
basic conflicts with China. There surely is no territorial dispute, the traditional basis for war. More

In contrast , there are many potential
complementarities between the two nations. China
possesses a great labor supply and potential markets, while the United States has technology, marketing capability, and organizational know-how.
Several American business successes in China are
quite stunning. For example, Procter & Gamble is
the largest daily-use consumer-products company,
domestic or foreign , operating in China. P & G's
Rejoice shampoo generates sales in Guangdong province only second to the level attained in the United
States.
Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore (the distinguished
senior minister) said it well, albeit melodramatically: "The size of China's displacement of the
world balance is such that the world must find a
new balance . . . This is the biggest player in the
history of man." The realignment of world power
relationships, in retrospect, may be akin to the experience of the United States in breaking into the
mid-19th century club of advanced industrialized
nations, then monopolized by Europe.
China is the mosr exciting business opportunity
in the global economy. In late 1994, the Gallup
Organization surveyed a sample of Chinese consumers across that vast nation. Keeping in mind the
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China is the most exciting business
opportunity in the global economy.

shortcomings of statistical extrapolation, Gallup reported that 95 percent have some electricity at home,
92 percent watch television, and 70 percent read a
newspaper. However, only 3 percent own an automobile, 4 percent have running water, 9 percent
own a telephone, and 24 percent have cable TV. In
terms of brand penetration, 62 percent have heard
of Coca-Cola, 22 percent Ford, 15 percent KFC,
and 14 percent Nike.
No other region contains China's potent combination of physical and human resources. In my
view, it is vital for Americans to better understand
events in that exotic part of the world and not be on
the outside trying to look in.

Listening to the experiences of
Americans and other foreigners who do
business in China, hard knocks are to
be expected.
Words of caution are always in order. Not all is
sweetness and light in that relationship. Americans
doing business in China report serious negatives,
especially tales of corruption, both personal and
official. More than 300,000 local government officials in the poor province of Anhui were recently
caught siphoning or misusing public funds. Most
were disciplined, but few were prosecuted.
Foreign businesses are often confused as to who
has the ultimate authority to negotiate deals in China.
Often there are many approvals or "chops" involved.
Some Western firms use Chinese intermediaries,
either from the mainland or among the ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs in Southeast Asia, to help with
the intricacies and special cultural nuances involved.
Personnel connections or guanzi can help in cutting
through the many layers of bureaucracy.
Many U.S. companies join forces with overseas
Chinese businesses in attempting to penetrate the
China market. These "bamboo network" firms can
10

serve as a valuable link between East and West,
especially in opening doors to newcomers to East
Asian ways of doing business.
AT&T and Lockheed from time to time have
joined forces with the companies of Li Ka-shing of
Hong Kong. Amoco Oil and Radisson Hotels
partnered with the Salim Group of Indonesia. The
insurance brokerage Alexander & Alexander entered
into extended arrangements with the Lippa Group
of Malaysia. KFC and 7-11 have joint ventures
with the Charoen Pokphand Group (or CP) of Thailand.
The head of the CP Group laments that U.S.
lawyers can destroy the chemistry needed between
partners to make a deal work, that the legalism so
endemic in the United States often clashes with the
Asian emphasis on personal relations. In any event,
Wal-Mart tried to work with CP to enter China but
wound up teaming up with enterprises in mainland
China. On a more positive note, in 1995 Monsanto
formed a joint 60-40 percent venture with the Jiangsu
Chemical Pesticide Group on the mainland to make
and market its Therminol heat-transfer fluids.
Listening to the experiences of Americans and
other foreigners who do business in China, hard
knocks are to be expected. Even some of the experienced Hong Kong investors got burned in 1989
when they opened a restaurant for tourists near
Tiananmen Square, just a week before the shooting.
No amount of guanzi or due diligence would have
prevented that fiasco. In a variation on that theme,
Gordon Y. S. Wu, the prosperous Hong Kong developer, stated on one occasion that there were more
sharks on the land (in Hong Kong) than in Victoria
Harbor.
China is the prime example of my standard forecast; in change, there is both threat and opportunity. Infeng shui (Chinese numerology), eight is a
lucky number. So, I leave you with my favorite
eight letters for dealing with China: Good luck!
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